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Liability for Use of Artificial Intelligence in
Medicine
W. Nicholson Price II, Sara Gerke, & I. Glenn Cohen
While artificial intelligence has substantial potential to improve medical
practice, errors will certainly occur, sometimes resulting in injury. Who
will be liable? Questions of liability for AI-related injury raise not only
immediate concerns for potentially liable parties, but also broader
systemic questions about how AI will be developed and adopted. The
landscape of liability is complex, involving health-care providers and
institutions and the developers of AI systems. In this chapter, we
consider these three principal loci of liability. At the outset, we note a
few issues that shape our analysis.
First, the field of tort liability for AI is still evolving. As of this writing,
health-care AI liability has still not been directly addressed in court
cases, mostly because the technology itself is so new and is still being
implemented. Accordingly, we consider general principles of tort law
and how they are most likely to apply.
Second, causation will often be challenging in AI tort contexts.
Demonstrating the cause of an injury is already often hard in the
medical context, where outcomes are frequently probabilistic rather
than deterministic. Adding in AI models that are often nonintuitive
and sometimes inscrutable will likely make causation even more
challenging to demonstrate.
Third, we focus on a United States perspective. The principles we
discuss are at some level generalizable, but ultimately there is enough
complexity that trying to capture international differences accurately is
infeasible in the space available. We do note in the conclusion some
potentially substantial changes on the European horizon.
Fourth, from a systemic perspective, individual healthcare professional
liability, complex though it is, represents only one piece of a larger
puzzle that system designers must try to put together to achieve a
comprehensive and optimally designed liability system. Many players
interact in the medical AI space, including actors who might carry
liability and regulators who may shape it. First, AI developers will make
many key choices, at least partially guided by the liability system,
regarding the underlying AI—will it be locked or adaptive? Will the
choice architecture make it easy or difficult to “overrule” the system?
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What data set will the system use? Second, the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) will (sometimes) determine the scope of
premarket review, if any, for medical AI, and depending on how those
requirements are set up, it may or may not preempt some tort liability.
Third, AI may be acquired by a hospital system, which may also have
co-developed it, trained the AI on the hospitals’ own Electronic Health
Record data—or even developed it entirely in-house. Decisions on
what to purchase, how to test it, and how to integrate the AI system
into nurse and physician workflow will, in part, be guided by liability
systems. A hospital system must decide how to invite or require
physician, nurses and other health-care providers to use the system—
will it adopt measures to try to nudge towards use or even, if legally
possible, require consultation with the system as part of the standard
of care? Fourth, providers will actually use the AI. Physicians have
historically tended to be independent contractors (less so recently, and
especially since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic1), while nurses
tend to be employees, such that the law may treat them differently, as
we discuss below. To the extent they have discretion, health care
workers will need to decide whether to use AI when offered and when
to follow versus ignore an AI-based recommendation—and may face
liability for those decisions. Fifth, health insurers and other payers
must decide whether to reimburse the hospital for its use/purchase of
the AI itself. They also have to decide when to reimburse for a service
in relation to what the AI recommends or fails to recommend—i.e.,
can they refuse to reimburse the full costs of a more expensive service
when the AI recommends a less expensive one? These decisions may
carry liability consequences. Sixth and finally, medical malpractice
insurers must decide whether they will cover and how they will defend
physicians who follow or fail to follow AI recommendations and get
sued.
If, as many think it ought to be, tort liability is an important way to
guide behavior in setting the rules for one level of this problem, one
must consider how it will interact with the rules at all the other levels
or else one can create bad incentives even if things go “right” at a
particular level. The interactions involved in medical AI create a
daunting landscape for such questions.
But before we can even begin to undertake that monumental task, we
have to at least understand each individual level on its own. We
consider three important potential loci of liability: individual healthcare providers, focused on physicians; institutions, focused on
hospitals; and developers.

1 Caitlin Owens, ‘Doctor Acquisitions Spiked amid the Pandemic’ (Axios)
<https://www.axios.com/doctor-hospitals-acquisitions-coronavirus-pandemic7bfdaf84-72fd-4870-b4fc-619a208edcf9.html> accessed 19 February 2022.
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I.

Physician Liability

The use of artificial intelligence systems in medicine raises unsettled
questions about liability of health-care providers such as physicians,
nurses, and other practitioners when patient injury results from
problems with AI.2 While we use physicians as our example here,
similar patterns apply for other providers who owe duties of care to
their patients.
At base, physicians have a duty to treat their patients according to the
standard of care. While different states express the standard of care
differently, it is typically something like the care that would be
provided by a competent physician of the same specialty, taking into
consideration the resources that are available. Most states apply a
national standard of care, but some are more solicitous of local
practice. The interactions between artificial intelligence and the
standard of care are complex and are likely to change over time. Since
no cases have yet squarely addressed how the standard of care is altered
by the use of an AI system, our analysis relies on the application of
medical malpractice law more generally.3
To explore how malpractice law shapes the potential liability of
physicians using AI in different ways, we consider a stylized fact
pattern, adapted from prior work,4 where AI makes a recommendation
either according to the standard of care or not, the recommendation is
correct or not, and the physician follows it or does not. The fact
pattern is highly stylized to make points clearer; in the real world, these
decisions are shrouded in probabilities and more complex, points we
explore more below.
Assume a physician is treating a new patient with chronic migraines.
The standard of care is Oldrug, a triptan with known moderate side
effects. Another treatment, Newdrug, is approved for non-migraine
use in cancer patients, but observational studies have shown that it may
reduce migraines dramatically. However, Newdrug has potentially
severe side effects and so is discouraged for use in treating migraines.
The physician will prescribe one drug or the other. The physician
enters her patient’s information into the electronic health record, and
an embedded AI system makes a recommendation for treatment.
Table 1, adapted from our prior work,5 shows the possible options that
could result.
Frank Griffin, ‘Artificial Intelligence and Liability in Health Care’ (2021) 31
Health Matrix 65, 95.
3 W Nicholson Price, Sara Gerke and I Glenn Cohen, ‘Potential Liability for
Physicians Using Artificial Intelligence’ (2019) 322 JAMA 17654.
4 ibid.
5 ibid.
2
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AI
Recommends
Oldrug
(standard of
care)

Newdrug
(not standard
of care)

Which
is:
Right
choice
for the
patient
Wrong
choice
for the
patient

Physician: Result:

#

Follows
advice
Rejects
advice
Follows
advice

Is Physician
Liable?
Healing Not liable (no
injury)
Injury
Liable

1

Injury

Not liable
(standard of
care)
Healing Not liable (no
injury)
Healing Not liable (no
injury)
Injury
Not liable
(standard of
care)*
Injury
Liable*

3

Healing Not liable (no
injury)

8

Rejects
advice
Right Follows
choice advice
for the Rejects
patient advice
Wrong
choice
for the
patient

Follows
advice
Rejects
advice

2

4
5
6
7

Malpractice law is at base conservative: because malpractice law
typically will find no liability for following the standard of care, the
physician will typically not be liable for prescribing Oldrug (the
standard of care), whatever else happens. If the drug works well, there
is obviously no liability because there is no injury (scenarios 1 & 8). If
the drug does not work well (scenarios 3 & 6), the physician will still
typically not be liable for injury because Oldrug is the standard of care.
If, on the other hand, the physician prescribes Newdrug, liability
becomes more likely. If Newdrug is the right choice for that patient
(the patient was healed), no injury results, and there is no liability
(scenarios 4 & 5). If, on the other hand, Newdrug is the wrong choice
for that patient, and there is resulting injury, the physician is likely to
be liable for actions falling below the standard of care, no matter what
the AI said (scenarios 2 & 7).
As the law currently stands, malpractice liability concerns incentivize
physicians to follow the standard of care they would have followed
before, no matter what the AI suggests; that is, they face incentives to
use AI systems essentially as confirmatory advice only. To be clear, this
practice may still result in benefits: if AI systems can suggest what the
standard of care is more quickly and easily (or can back that standard
up with helpful practice guidelines or other supporting materials), they
may still streamline the task of physicians. But to the extent that AI
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can improve care by suggesting treatments that are better than the
standard of care, this approach leaves unrealized some of the value of
AI. It also decreases the incentives for adoption; if a significant fraction
of the value of medical AI results from nonstandard
recommendations, but physicians are unlikely to follow those
recommendations, the benefit of AI is decreased and hurdles to
adoption are correspondingly more salient.
However, we note two scenarios in the table (noted with asterisks) that
have the most possibility for change or development as AI systems
become more prevalent, more accepted, and (ideally) better.
First, in scenario 6, the AI system correctly recommends Newdrug, a
treatment outside the normal standard of care, and the physician
rejects this recommendation, prescribing Oldrug and resulting in
patient injury. Under existing law, the physician would most likely be
shielded from malpractice liability because she followed the standard
of care. But this result is not necessarily static; as AI systems become
more prevalent, following AI advice may itself be incorporated into
the standard of care, such that ignoring the advice would render a
physician liable for resulting injury. While such a shift is possible,
malpractice law’s conservatism renders it unlikely in the near future:
the commonly applied “two schools of thought” or “respectable
minority” doctrines typically shield from liability physicians who
follow the practices of a respectable minority, even if those practices
are behind the times.
Second, in scenario 7, the AI system incorrectly recommends
Newdrug, still outside the normal standard of care, and the physician
accepts this recommendation, prescribing Newdrug and resulting in
patient injury. Under existing law, the physician would most likely be
liable for malpractice liability because she deviated from the standard
of care and caused patient injury. Here, too, the situation could change
if following AI recommendations become part of the standard of care.
The “respectable minority” or “two schools of thought” doctrines
would then work to shield the physician from liability because she
would have adhered to the standard of care in following the AI
recommendations. This shift, as AI becomes more accepted, seems
substantially more likely to occur in the short term, though as noted
above, caselaw is still substantially undeveloped. Note that the path to
this future has pitfalls because up until AI systems are accepted as part
of the standard of care, physicians deviating from the standard of care
are more vulnerable to liability than those simply following older
practice patterns.
Whether following AI has become part of the standard of care is likely
to be practice-area- and application-specific, rather than a general
determination across the field of medicine. Such determinations are
5
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likely to be influenced by various markers of approbation such as FDA
clearance or approval, recommendations by learned societies, and
practice guidelines. But the ultimate determination will likely remain a
conclusion of what competent physicians actually do, reached by
courts after arguments by expert witnesses.
Interesting empirical work suggests that AI may already be shifting into
the standard of care—at least in lay conceptions. Kevin Tobia, Aileen
Nielson, and Alexander Stremitzer undertook a vignette study of 2,000
individuals to simulate the views of lay jurors in the range of scenarios
described in Table 1 (though focused only on the scenarios where
patient injury resulted).6 They found that these potential jurors typically
thought physicians should not be liable for following AI
recommendations of nonstandard care (i.e., AI incorrectly
recommending Newdrug), even when injury resulted.7 That is, in
scenario 7, though the theoretical application of existing law suggests
liability, lay intuition is already that physicians acted acceptably. (Study
participants were more ambivalent about whether physicians should
face liability for rejecting an AI’s nonstandard recommendation).8 Lay
participants seemed to demonstrate a “follow-both” model, where
physicians could act reasonably either by following the standard of care
or by following an AI system’s nonstandard recommendation—in
either case, study participants found physician actions fairly
reasonable.9
The law does not, of course, directly follow lay perceptions of
reasonableness on the ground. While lay individuals do serve as jurors,
experts will testify as to the standard of care, local custom and practice
typically matter a great deal, and most cases never reach the jury,
whether because judges determine the answer as a matter of law or
because cases settle.10 Physician behavior will matter more than lay
perception, but the fact that lay perception is already changing may
hint that physician changes to the standard of care could start sooner
than one might think.
Some argue that the adoption of AI into the standard of care will have
negative impacts, even as it would increase the use of AI. Michael
Froomkin, Joelle Pineau, and the late Ian Kerr suggest that if
6 Kevin Tobia, Aileen Nielsen and Alexander Stremitzer, ‘When Does Physician
Use of AI Increase Liability?’ [2020] Journal of Nuclear Medicine
<https://jnm.snmjournals.org/content/early/2020/09/25/jnumed.120.256032>
accessed 15 February 2022.
7 ibid.
8 ibid.
9 ibid.
10 W Nicholson Price, Sara Gerke and I Glenn Cohen, ‘How Much Can Potential
Jurors Tell Us About Liability for Medical Artificial Intelligence?’ (2021) 62 Journal
of Nuclear Medicine 15.
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physicians become too deferential to AI because following AI
recommendations becomes the standard of care (and rejecting those
recommendations, even if in accordance with older practice, invites
liability), physicians may lose their skills and knowledge over time.11 If
AI performance degrades over time due to expected phenomena like
dataset shift as patient populations and patterns of care change,12 the
health system will eventually be in a worse place than it would without
AI—and physicians will have lost the ability to fix things.13 We think
this outcome relatively unlikely, at least in the foreseeable future, in
part because the respectable minority doctrine protects older practice
patterns, allowing physicians to continue doing what they are doing
and avoid using AI.
Finally, once the use of AI becomes part of the standard of care, which
will almost certainly happen over some period of time, what will be the
standard of care for physicians with respect to the use of AI itself?14 It
would be unusual to conclude that a physician should blindly defer to
an AI system’s recommendation whatever it might be; consider a
clearly erroneous recommendation to prescribe a very high dose of
thalidomide to a pregnant person for the treatment of mild nausea. But
how much should physicians defer to AI systems, and how should they
interrogate recommendations, especially given the black-box nature of
many AI systems and the inability to interrogate the bases beneath
decisions? Once AI becomes just another tool in the physician’s
toolkit, how must that tool be used? How will FDA approval, or the
lack thereof, play into this picture? Some AI systems will escape
regulatory review altogether;15 the very definition of FDA-regulable
medical device systems that make the bases for a recommendation
available for a physician to question and to independently decide
whether to accept the recommendations.16 Will the standard of care
require such questioning? Even if physicians cannot determine the
actual reasoning behind a decision, must they evaluate procedural
indicia of quality and reliability, such as how the system was developed
or validated?17 Who will supervise those indicia of quality? These
issues, too, will unfold in courts and other arenas as injuries happen
and lawsuits follow.
11 A Michael Froomkin, Ian Kerr and Joelle Pineau, ‘When AIs Outperform
Doctors: Confronting the Challenges of a Tort-Induced over-Reliance on Machine
Learning’ (2019) 61 Ariz. L. Rev. 33.
12 W Nicholson Price II, ‘Medical Malpractice and Black-Box Medicine’, Big Data,
Health Law, and Bioethics (I. Glenn Cohen, Holly F. Lynch, Effy Vayena, and Urs Gasse,
eds.) (Cambridge University Press 2018)
<https://repository.law.umich.edu/book_chapters/169>.
13 Froomkin, Kerr and Pineau (n 11).
14 Price II (n 12).
15 W Nicholson Price II, Rachel Sachs and Rebecca S Eisenberg, ‘New Innovation
Models in Medical AI’ (2022) 99 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1121.
16 21st Century Cures Act, § 3060(a).
17 Price II (n 12)
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II.

Institutional Liability

We turn now to institutional liability at the hospital or practice group
level—when are they liable for instances when a particular AI use causes
an adverse event for the patient? Here it is useful to distinguish two
separate theories—derivative liability for the actions of physicians or
others and direct liability for the institution itself.

A. Derivative Liability for Hospital Use of AI
Derivative liability depends on first establishing medical malpractice or
some other form of liability on the part of the physician or other
health-care provider and then using one of the recognized legal
theories that traces that liability to the institution. Under the doctrine
of respondeat superior, an “employer is subject to liability for torts
committed by employees while acting within the scope of their
employment.”18 As the Minnesota Supreme Court recently put it, a
“hospital is vicariously liable for the negligence of its employees where
the hospital has control over the actions of the employees,” but “[i]f
there is a break in the chain of control between employer and
employee, the hospital cannot be vicariously liable under the doctrine
of respondeat superior.”19 Under this theory, should a patient have a
bona fide malpractice claim relating to a hospital employee’s tortious
use of AI to direct the patient’s care, and the activities were within the
employee’s scope of employment, the liability may flow to the hospital
system. A similar theory allows institutional liability if health-care
providers are not formally employed but are subject to sufficient
control by the hospital to be treated as employees for liability
purposes.20
The composition of most hospital workforces, however, complicates
matters. While most nurses are employees of a hospital and thus
respondeat superior theories may be available as to their negligence,
many (but not all) hospital physicians are independent contractors. For
those who are independent contractors, respondeat superior will not
be available as a theory to reach the hospital at all. But there is a sister
theory, often referred to as “apparent authority” which may be
available in these cases and applies “when a third party reasonably
believes the actor has authority to act on behalf of the principal and
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (2006).
Popovich v Allina Health System (2020) 946 NW 2d 885 (Minn: Supreme Court) 891.
20 Scott v SSM Healthcare St Louis (2002) 70 SW 3d 560 (Mo: Court of Appeals,
Eastern Dist, 3rd Div).
18
19
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that belief is traceable to the principal's manifestations.”21 As the
Minnesota Supreme Court recently stated, the principle in a case
regarding hospitals and independent contractor physicians, the
doctrine has two requirements—the principal “must have either held
the agent out as having authority or knowingly permitted the agent to
act on its behalf” and there was “reliance, meaning that the plaintiff
was aware of these representations of authority by the principal.”22 As
to the reliance element there is a further question of whether actual
reliance is required: whether “a plaintiff must show that certain actions
would not have been taken but for the appearance of an agent's
authority,” meaning in the hospital context, must a plaintiff show she
would not have accepted care as a patient had she known that the
physician was not an employee of the hospital system and only an
independent contractor.23 The trend has been against requiring this
kind of but-for show as to reliance, but not all courts have decided
how to apply the test to hospital systems. As applied to our context,
should a patient have a bona fide malpractice claim relating to an
independent contractor physician’s use of AI to direct the patient’s
care, and the patient can show that hospital presented the physician as
its agent and the plaintiff reasonably relied on that representation, then
liability may flow to the hospital system.
None of the analysis, thus far, has turned on something distinct about
AI; instead, we have just applied the rules governing derivative liability
for hospitals to a case where the underlying tort claim relates to AI.
When would AI pose distinct liability issues? Scott Schweikart has
suggested very briefly that if “a court deems an AI to be fully
autonomous (or, if not autonomous, maybe held to be under the
dominion of its designers rather than the hospital who purchased and
uses it), then holding a hospital vicariously liable for any injury caused
by AI will be impossible, as such an autonomous AI will functionally
be outside of the principal's control.”24 It is true that the respondeat
superior theory breaks down if this eventuality should ever occur, but
it is not clear that apparent agency—which does not depend on
control—would dissipate.25 The harder question is whether a hospital’s
derivative liability could ever be premised on an underlying theory of
the AI as an autonomous tortfeasor as opposed to derivative liability
traced to the physician who tortiously uses the AI. When the
underlying tort is products liability, discussed in greater depth below,
it seems more plausible to think of the hospital’s liability as being a
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 (2006).
Popovich v. Allina Health System (n 19) 895 (cleaned up).
23 ibid 895–96.
24 Scott J Schweikart, ‘Who Will Be Liable for Medical Malpractice in the Future?
How the Use of Artificial Intelligence in Medicine Will Shape Medical Tort Law’
(2021) 22 Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology 1, 16.
25 See Cefaratti v Aranow (2016) 141 A 3d 752 (Conn: Supreme Court) 609 (noting
that apparent agency can apply even without control).
21
22

9
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2022

9

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 241 [2022]

species of direct liability than derivative liability such as respondeat
superior. These possibilities remain speculative for now.

B. Direct Liability for Hospital Use of AI
Apart from the duties of their agents, hospitals also have duties to their
patients that can generate direct liability for the hospital as an
institution. Such theories are applicable to decisions the hospital makes
as to AI, though thus far we have not seen any reported decisions on
such fact patterns.
There are two main hospital direct liability theories that might be
applied to the use of medical AI in the future: (1) negligent
selection/retention and (2) negligent supervision.
The first imposes upon a hospital system a duty to review “physicians’
competency and performance history before admission to the medical
staff and periodically (typically every two years) thereafter.”26 As the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin put it, to recover a plaintiff must “show
that the defendant did not exercise reasonable care (that degree of care
ordinarily exercised by the average hospital) to determine whether [the
physician] was competent.”27 A plaintiff might argue that a hospital
system is, in a sense, hiring not buying an AI, and that this imposes
duties to determine prior errors leading to adverse events from the use
of this AI, to review whether, by whom, and the quality of certification,
and perhaps even to determine how it will “fit in” with the existing
hospital workforce much as one would hiring a live person.28
Moreover, this review cannot be a one-and-done and instead ought to
be continuous or at least periodic. It is possible that courts will find
this theory a step too far in terms of anthropomorphizing AI. Even if
the theory is endorsed, the test for negligence practically depends in
part on a comparison to what degree of care is used in these
determinations by other hospital systems, which creates a problem at
this nascent stage of AI integration in healthcare. But we need not wait
for hospital custom to evolve on its own. As one of us has put it
“policymakers could try to move hospitals’ standard of care for
implementing black-box algorithms toward one that would involve
procedural tools to make sure that algorithms are well validated and
competently developed before implementation.”29
26 Mark A Hall and others, Health Care Law and Ethics (Wolters Kluwer 2018) 445.
While most courts recognize the theory of liability, at least one has rejected it, see
Paulino v QHG of Springdale, Inc (2012) 386 SW 3d 462 (Ark: Supreme Court).
27 Johnson v Misericordia Community Hosp (1981) 301 NW 2d 156 (Wis: Supreme
Court) 739.
28 Price II (n 12) 303 (“hospitals could be liable for negligently choosing,
implementing, and using black-box medical systems.”).
29 ibid 304.
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Negligent supervision is, by contrast, more controversial even as to
flesh-and-blood hospital personnel. Rather than imposing a duty at the
time of hiring and periodic review, this theory “assumes contemporaneous
supervision of daily treatment decisions as they are made.”30 While
several decisions have alluded to such a duty, it has largely been in
dictum31 or imposed in cases “of gross negligence in which the
departure from medical standards is so blatant that it is possible to
attribute to hospital administrators’ constructive knowledge of the
error in progress.”32 Especially as to more opaque forms of medical
AI, we think courts will be more skeptical of negligent supervision
theories applying. Both as a predictive matter of what courts will do
and as a normative judgment about what the tort law should be, it does
not seem desirable to impose a duty upon hospitals to supervise each
AI recommendation and/or reliance thereon by a physician “as they
are made” in addition to the negligent selection/retention duties and
whatever derivative liability exists. Instead, we think that a test for
negligent supervision that ties liability more closely to gross rather than
regular negligence in this space does a better job of realistically setting
the duties of hospital systems in a way that will not overdeter the
adoption of health-promoting medical AI.
Beyond these two primary theories, one more is worth mentioning
though it is more penumbral: while “hospitals are typically not liable
for defects in the products they provide and/or sell, they may have a
duty to nonnegligently evaluate the quality of those products and may
be liable for failures of products that they fail to evaluate.”33 One of
the few cases in this line, Parker v. St. Vincent Hospital, involving a suit
against a hospital relating to implanted bilateral artificial
temporomandibular joint replacement devices that were made by
Vitek, Inc. in a surgery performed at the hospital.34 The New Mexico
Court of Appeals held that it was not “appropriate to impose strict
products liability on hospitals with respect to a defectively designed
medical product selected by the treating physician.”35 In the same
opinion it did suggest that an action for negligence against the hospital
could be valid, although it hemmed and hawed and ultimately did not
decide the scope of that duty. Nevertheless, some of its reflections are
germane to the question we address:

Hall and others (n 26) 445.
ibid 446 (citing Thompson v Nason Hosp (1991) 591 A 2d 703 (Pa: Supreme
Court)).
32 Hall and others (n 26) 445–46. Some courts have rejected the tort theory
outright. ibid 445 (citing Essig v Advocate BroMenn Medical Center (2015) 33 NE 3d
288 (Ill: Appellate Court, 4th Dist)).
33 Price II (n 12) 303.
34 Parker v St Vincent Hosp (1996) 919 P 2d 1104 (NM: Court of Appeals) 41. 1996).
35 ibid 42.
30
31
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Should a hospital conduct its own research study regarding the
efficacy and safety of implants; should it review the medical
literature for pertinent findings by researchers elsewhere; should it
monitor the experience of patients who receive implants at the
hospital? . . .
On the record before us, however, we cannot confidently make
that determination. We are unable to determine whether
imposition on a hospital of any particular duty to investigate the
safety of implants or other medical devices promotes or retards
public policy. If a duty to investigate would require considerable
effort and expense by hospitals, resulting in higher costs for
medical care, but would add little to patient safety, it would be
unwise to impose the duty. Safety would not be enhanced, for
example, if the hospital were merely duplicating efforts by the
FDA, particularly given that the hospital would have a far smaller
data base to work from, which could lead it to draw inaccurate
inferences. On the other hand, if, as alleged by an expert witness
provided by Plaintiffs, hospitals already have a duty under federal
law to conduct the sort of investigation Plaintiffs would require,
then there may be little reason not to impose liability on a hospital
that injures a patient because of failure to perform that duty with
due care. On remand these matters can be explored and a record
prepared that is adequate for the court to make a proper judgment
on the existence and scope of any duty to investigate.36
We think these same problems appear in spades with any attempt to
specify the scope of a theory of negligent evaluation of medical AI.
Hospitals will, especially in the case of more-opaque medical AI, lack
the expertise to conduct their own evaluations. Moreover, unlike with
some other medical devices, many medical AI systems will not have
gone through any premarket review by the FDA, which could be
treated as a seal of approval. Our instinct, though it is only an instinct,
is that it may be better to channel these cases through the gates of
either the negligent selection/retention tort or products liability, rather
than recognizing an additional tort theory in the medical AI world
analogous to Parker.

III. Developer Liability
In addition to potential physician and institutional liability, there is also
a pressing question of how and whether developers of faulty medical
AI can be held liable under current tort law.37 In the following, we first
explain the difference between negligence and strict liability. We then
discuss FDA regulation and its potentially preemptive effects.
36
37

ibid 47.
Griffin (n 2) 78.
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A. Difference Between Negligence and Strict Liability
Suppose a physician uses a medical AI in the treatment of an African
American patient with cancer. The AI recommends an incorrect
nonstandard drug dosage that the physician follows, and the patient’s
condition worsens. As seen above,38 the physician may likely be held
liable for causing injury to the patient. However, it turns out that the
reason for the faulty AI recommendation was that the model was
mainly trained on data from Caucasian patients. While the physician in
this hypothetical scenario will likely incur liability for a bad patient
outcome under current law,39 one key question still remains to be
answered: Could the developer of the medical AI be likely held liable
for negligence because the model was predominantly trained on data
from Caucasian patients?
To establish a prima facie case for negligence, the plaintiff (here, the
African American patient) must prove—by a preponderance of the
evidence (i.e., more than 50%)—four elements: duty, breach,
causation, and damage.40 A successful negligence claim thus requires
that the defendant (here, the AI developer) owes a legal duty to the
patient and that this duty was accidentally breached, which caused the
patient’s injury.
Up to the 1910s, injured consumers of flawed products were often
unable to successfully sue manufacturers for negligence because they
could not establish a duty of care due to a lack of contractual privity.41
Nowadays, courts no longer require privity for the existence of such a
duty and assume it.42 However, consumers still need to establish a
breach of this duty, injury to them, and actual and proximate causation
between the breach and the injury to recover for negligence.
The challenges faced by injured consumers in proving fault and thus
succeeding in a negligence claim against manufacturers eventually led
to the introduction of strict products liability in the 1960s.43 The
§ 402 A of Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) states:

See section I and Price, Gerke and Cohen (n 3).
See ibid.
40 For more information on the negligence concept see eg, John L. Diamond,
Lawrence C. Levine and Anita Bernstein, Understanding Torts (6th edn, Carolina
Academic Press 2018) Chapter 3.
41 See eg, MacPherson v Buick Motor Company 111 N.E. 1050 (NY 1916).
42 James Underwood, Tort Law: Principles in Practice (2nd edn, Wolters Kluwer) 745.
43 See Greenman v Yuba Power Products 59 Cal.2d 57 (1963). See for the initial
development eg Escola v Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno 150 P.2d 436 (Cal 1944).
38
39
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(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his
property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to
the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such
a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or
consumer without substantial change in the condition in
which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the
preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller (emphasis
added).
Products liability—which is generally considered a strict liability of
manufacturers for product defects—has evolved over time and courts
have established three types of product defects, namely (1) design
defects, (2) manufacturing defects, and (3) marketing defects.44 While
a design defect is inherent and already exists before manufacturing the
product, a manufacturing defect is a physical departure from the
intended product’s design and occurs during its production or
construction.45 Marketing defects refer to inadequate instructions or
failures to warn consumers about possible risks associated with the use
of the product.46
For instance, in our hypothetical example, a claim for a marketing
defect may be given if the labeling of the AI did not include a warning
that the model may likely not give reliable/correct recommendations
when used in non-Caucasian patients. Obviously, such a model that
has not been trained on a diverse patient population should not be
placed on the market in the first place and may thus also trigger a
design defect suit.47 When considering health care software, however,
most courts have so far been hesitant to hold developers liable under
44
Cornell
Law
School,
‘Products
Liability’
<https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/products_liability> accessed 13 February 2022;
Sara Gerke, Timo Minssen and I. Glenn Cohen, ‘Ethical and Legal Challenges of
Artificial Intelligence-Driven Healthcare’ in Adam Bohr and Kaveh Memarzadeh
(eds), Artificial Intelligence in Healthcare (Elsevier 2020) 314; For case law see eg,
American Tobacco Co. v Grinnell 951 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. 1997).
45 Cornell Law School (n 44); Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability (1998),
§ 1, comment a.
46 Cornell Law School (n 44).
47 See also Barbara J. Evans and Frank Pasquale, ‘Product Liability Suits for FDARegulated AI/ML Software’ in I Glenn Cohen and others (eds), The Future of
Medical Device Regulation: Innovation and Protection (Cambridge University Press,
forthcoming 2022).
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products liability theories.48 The reason for this seems to be the
assumption that such software is a clinical decision support tool that
only gives recommendations and that it is the physician who ultimately
decides.49 In other words, software has been interpreted as a service
rather than a product.50 Thus, under current case law, it is likely that
injured patients will have a hard time successfully suing developers of
medical AIs under products liability. But a courts’ shift to products
liability is not inconceivable in the future considering that highperforming deep learning networks are increasingly being deployed in
medicine, which are impossible or difficult for humans to understand
(so-called “black boxes”).51
An important distinction here is between a medical AI system that
received marketing authorization by the FDA and a medical AI system
that is marketed without the need for FDA review. This distinction
may be relevant for future court decisions regarding whether products
liability applies in cases of health care software. The FDA does not
regulate the practice of medicine (i.e., services), but it does regulate
medical devices, and if health care software is classified as such in a
particular case, products liability is not outside the realm of possibility
in the future.52
The distinction also matters now because regulatory actions by the
FDA may preempt state law, insulating some AI manufacturers from
state-law tort claims. We now turn to FDA preemption.

B. FDA Preemption and Its Interaction with FDA
Regulation
FDA preemption is a controversial legal theory that shields
manufacturers of certain products from tort claims. Express preemption
means that the federal statute—here, the U.S. Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA)—explicitly includes a preemption provision
that all or some state law is displaced.53 There is also implied field
48 W Nicholson Price II, ‘Artificial Intelligence in Health Care: Applications and
Legal Implications’ (2017) 14 The SciTech Lawyer 10, 11.
49 ibid 12.
50 Evans and Pasquale (n 47).
51 For more information on black boxes see eg, W Nicholson Price II, ‘Black-Box
Medicine’ (2015) 28 Harv. JL & Tech. 419; W Nicholson Price II, ‘Regulating BlackBox Medicine’ (2017) 116 Mich L Rev 421; Boris Babic and others, ‘Beware
Explanations From AI in Health Care’ (2021) 373 Science 284; Boris Babic and Sara
Gerke, ‘Explaining Medical AI Is Easier Said Than Done’ (STAT, 21 July 2021)
<https://www.statnews.com/2021/07/21
/explainable-medical-ai-easier-said-than-done> accessed 13 February 2022.
52 Evans and Pasquale (n 47).
53 Peter Barton Hutt, Richard A Merrill and Lewis A Grossman, Food and Drug Law.
Cases and Materials (4th edn, Foundation Press 2014) 292.
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preemption in cases where the statutory language is not express, but the
displacement of state law can be implied by Congress’s intent to
occupy the area exclusively.54 Lastly, there is conflict preemption, such as
in cases where state and federal requirements contradict each other,
and a party cannot comply with both.55
In the context of medical AI, FDCA Section 521 provides for
preemption. It states:
(a) GENERAL RULE.—Except as provided in
subsection (b), no State or political subdivision of a State
may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device
intended for human use any requirement—
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any
requirement applicable under this Act to the device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the
device or to any other matter included in a
requirement applicable to the device under this
Act.
(b)
EXEMPT
REQUIREMENTS.—Upon
application of a State or a political subdivision thereof,
the Secretary may, by regulation promulgated after notice
and opportunity for an oral hearing, exempt from
subsection (a), under such conditions as may be
prescribed in such regulation, a requirement of such State
or political subdivision applicable to a device intended
for human use if—
(1) the requirement is more stringent than a
requirement under this Act which would be
applicable to the device if an exemption were not
in effect under this subsection; or
(2) the requirement—
(A) is required by compelling local
conditions, and
(B) compliance with the requirement
would not cause the device to be in violation
of any applicable requirement under this
Act.56
Consequently, FDCA Section 521 generally displaces state law with
respect to medical devices for human use. The term “medical device”
is defined in FDCA Section 201(h). Some AI-based products are
classified as medical devices (AI-based medical devices) under FDCA
Section 201(h) because they are “intended for use in the diagnosis of
ibid.
ibid.
56 FDCA, Section 521 (emphasis added).
54
55
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disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or
prevention of disease.” Others fall outside the scope of the medical
device definition and thus a priori of FDCA Section 521 and its express
preemption. In particular, software functions pursuant to FDCA
Section 520(o) are not considered medical devices under FDCA
Section 201(h). For example, many medical AIs that support specific
clinical decisions by providing transparent recommendations to healthcare professionals meet this exception and thus are not classified as
medical devices.57
Suppose an AI-based product is classified as a medical device. In that
case, it is regulated by the FDA and usually needs to undergo
premarket review.58 Depending on their risk level (i.e., low, moderate,
high), AI-based medical devices are categorized into three classes (i.e.,
Class I, Class II, and Class III).59 The device class is usually pivotal in
determining the applicable premarket pathway.60 There are three
common premarket submissions for medical devices:
(1) 510(k) Premarket Notification,
(2) De Novo Classification Request, and
(3) Premarket Approval (PMA).61
In general, the 510(k) (clearance) pathway is applicable for Class I or
Class II medical devices that are not exempt from premarket
submission and that are substantially equivalent to a so-called
“predicate”—a legally marketed device.62 The De Novo Classification
Request applies to new low- to moderate-risk medical devices that have
no predicate device and provides a pathway to classify such devices
into Class I or Class II.63 Finally, PMA is for most Class III (highest
FDCA Section 520(o)(1)(E). For more information on this exception see also
FDA, ‘Clinical Decision Support Software — Draft Guidance for Industry and Food
and
Drug
Administration
Staff’
(2019)
<https://www.fda.gov/media/109618/download> accessed 14 February 2022;
Price II, Sachs and Eisenberg (n 15).
58 Eg the FDA exercises enforcement discretion over some low-risk medical devices,
see eg FDA, ‘Policy for Device Software Functions and Mobile Medical Applications
— Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Administration Staff’ (2019)
<https://www.fda.gov/media/80958/download> accessed 14 February 2022.
59 See FDA, ‘How to Study and Market Your Device’ (14 October 2020)
<https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/device-advice-comprehensive-regulatoryassistance/how-study-and-market-your-device> accessed 14 February 2022.
60 ibid.
61 ibid.
62 For more information on the 510(k) pathway, see eg FDA, ‘Premarket Notification
510(k)’ (13 March 2020) <https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/premarketsubmissions/premarket-notification-510k> accessed 14 February 2022. See also
FDCA s 513(i).
63 For more information on the De Novo process, see eg FDA, ‘De Novo
Classification Request’ (7 January 2022) <https://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/premarket-submissions/de-novo-classification-request>
accessed
14
February 2022. See also FDCA s 513(f)(1) and (2).
57
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risk) medical devices and is the most strict premarket submission type
by requiring valid scientific evidence that the device is reasonably safe
and effective for the intended use.64 There are also some Class III
medical devices that may only require a 510(k).65
Almost all AI-based medical devices on the U.S. market received
510(k) clearances.66 For example, Philips’s Precision Position was
FDA-cleared in June 2021.67 This device uses AI algorithms to
precisely position a patient before a CT scan.68 Only a few marketed
AI-based medical devices received authorization through the De Novo
process, and only one AI-based medical device has so far received
PMA approval.69 For example, Oxehealth Vital Signs is an AI-based
medical device that analyzes video signals and estimates a patient’s
heart, pulse, respiratory, and breathing rates.70 This device, which is
incorporated into a vision-based patient management and monitoring
platform called Oxevision, received marketing authorization from the
FDA via the DeNovo pathway in March 2021.71
The fact that most marketed AI-based medical devices are 510(k)cleared is crucial in limiting the scope of preemption: The U.S.
Supreme Court ruled in Medtronic, Inc. v Lohr (1996) that FDCA Section
521(a) did not preempt the state-law tort claims of the plaintiffs, Lora
Lohr and her husband, in the failure of Lora Lohr’s Medtronic
pacemaker.72 In this case, Medtronic pacemaker was a Class III medical
device that underwent a 510(k) and was found substantially
equivalent.73 In particular, the Supreme Court argued that “[s]ince the
§ 510(k) process is focused on equivalence, not safety, substantial
equivalence determinations provide little protection to the public,” and
FDA (n 59). For more information on PMA, see eg FDA, ‘Premarket Approval
(PMA)’ (16 May 2019) <https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/premarketsubmissions/premarket-approval-pma> accessed 14 February 2022. See also FDCA
s 513(a)(1)(C).
65 FDA (n 62).
66 FDA, ‘Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning (AI/ML)-Enabled Medical
Devices’ (22 September 2021) <https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/softwaremedical-device-samd/artificial-intelligence-and-machine-learning-aiml-enabledmedical-devices> accessed 14 February 2022.
67 Letter from the FDA to Philips Healthcare (Suzhou) Co., Ltd., ‘K203514’ (17 June
2021)
<https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/pdf20/K203514.pdf>
accessed 14 February 2022.
68 ibid.
69 ibid.
70 Letter from the FDA to Oxehealth Limited, ‘DEN200019’ (26 March 2021)
<https://www.oxehealth.com/news/fda-grants-oxehealth-vital-signs-de-novoclearance> accessed 14 February 2022.
71 ibid. Oxehealth, ‘FDA Grants Oxehealth Vital Signs De Novo Clearance;
Oxehealth Launches in the US’ (2021) <https://www.oxehealth.com/news/fdagrants-oxehealth-vital-signs-de-novo-clearance> accessed 14 February 2022.
72 Medtronic, Inc. v Lohr 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
73 ibid.
64
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thus device manufacturers would need to defend themselves against
state-law negligent design claims.74 It also refused to accept preemption
for Lohrs’ manufacturing and labeling (failure to warn) claims because
these requirements were too general and not concerned with respect
to a particular medical device.75
In Riegel v Medtronic, Inc. (2008), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that
FDCA Section 521(a) preempts “common-law claims challenging the
safety or effectiveness of a medical device marketed in a form that
received premarket approval from the FDA.”76 This time, the court
considered a Medtronic catheter, a Class III medical device that
received a PMA approval.77 The catheter ruptured in the coronary
artery of Charles Riegel during heart surgery, and Charles Riegel and
his spouse, Donna Riegel, filed a suit against Medtronic, alleging that
the device’s label, design, and manufacture violated New York
common law.78 In contrast to Lohr, the Medtronic catheter underwent
a PMA (rather than 510(k)) in this case, and thus Medtronic provided
valid scientific evidence that the device was reasonably safe and
effective for the intended use.
Consequently, manufacturers of an AI-based medical device that
receive PMA approval are likely protected against state-law tort claims
which challenge the device’s safety or effectiveness.79 However, only
one AI-based medical device has so far gone through PMA.80 Since
most marketed AI-based medical devices were cleared via the 510(k)
pathway, the vast majority of manufacturers are not shielded from such
state-law tort claims under the preemption clause in FDCA Section
521(a). In Lohr and Riegel, the U.S. Supreme Court did not address the
issue of whether FDCA Section 521(a) preempts state-law tort claims
that challenge the safety or effectiveness of marketed medical devices
that underwent the De Novo process. On the one hand, since the
PMA is the most rigorous type of premarket submission and requires
a premarket approval, judges may argue that manufacturers of De
Novo-devices are not protected from state-law liability. On the other
hand, if the AI-based medical device is classified into Class II via the
De Novo pathway, it requires special controls and manufacturers must
“provide reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness and a
ibid.
ibid.
76 Riegel v Medtronic, Inc. 552 U.S. 312 (2008) Syllabus.
77 ibid.
78 ibid.
79 For an in-depth analysis of preemption in the context of PMA approval and AIbased medical devices, see also Charlotte Tschider, ‘Medical Device Artificial
Intelligence: The New Tort Frontier’ (2021) 46 BYU L Rev 1551.
80 See FDA (n 64). For an in-depth analysis of the challenges of the PMA process,
preemption, and AI-based medical devices, see Charlotte Tschider, ‘Medical Device
Artificial Intelligence: The New Tort Frontier’ (2021) 46 BYU L Rev 1551.
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description of how the special controls provide such assurance.”81
Thus, one might convincingly argue that manufacturers of marketed
Class II devices that underwent the De Novo process may be
protected from state-law tort claims that challenge the device’s safety
or effectiveness through FDCA Section 521(a) in accordance with Lohr
and Riegel.82 Until the Supreme Court weighs in, we will not know for
sure. In general, with the rapid development in medical AI, the
regulatory framework may change in the future,83 including the
preemption landscape. Stakeholders should thus watch this space.

IV. Conclusion and Moving Forward
We close with a few thoughts about liability writ large. First, and
broadest, this is a space in flux; we have laid out the workings of
generally applicable law, but there remains substantial uncertainty as to
how these factors will fall into place once cases start coming to
courts—and legislatures and regulators could always step in to change
things substantially. The most obvious changes are to the standard of
care, where the use of AI is likely to become an accepted part of the
standard care over time, but likely at different rates in different parts
of medical practice. But the way FDA (or other regulators) regulate
FDA, and potential implications on liability, could also easily change.
The European Union, though mostly outside our scope here, provides
one example of substantial possible change. In October 2020, the
European Parliament released its Resolution on a Civil Liability
Regime for Artificial Intelligence.84 Most notably, the proposed
framework would apply strict liability for operators, both front-end
and back-end of “high-risk” AI systems (as such systems are defined
in the EU’s proposed AI Act).85 Presumably, this would include healthFDCA s 513(f)(2)(A)(v).
See also James M Beck, ‘FDA De Novo Device Classification Process &
Preemption’
(10
December
2018)
<https://www.druganddevicelawblog.com/2018/12/fda-de-novo-deviceclassification-process-preemption.html> accessed 20 February 2020.
83 See eg Sara Gerke, ‘Health AI For Good Rather Than Evil? The Need For a New
Regulatory Framework For AI-Based Medical Devices’ (2022) Yale J Health Pol’y L
& Ethics.
84 European Parliament resolution of 20 October 2020 with recommendations to
the Commission on a civil liability regime for artificial intelligence
(2020/2014(INL)), EUR. PARL. DOC. PV(18) (Oct. 20, 2020),
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2020-0276_EN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/86QQ-XZD2] [hereinafter Resolution on Civil Liability for AI].
85 Resolution on Civil Liability for AI at 7; European Commission Proposal of 21
April 2021 for a Regulation Of The European Parliament And Of The
CouncilLaying Down Harmonised Rules On Artificial Intelligence (Artificial
Intelligence Act) And Amending Certain Union Legislative Acts, https://eur81
82
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care providers, hospitals, and developers involved in the continuing
operation of their systems.86 The Resolution also states that an
operator “shall not be able to escape liability by arguing that the harm
or damage was caused by an autonomous activity, device or process
driven by his or her AI-system,” directly ruling out the argument that
autonomous AI might be an intervening cause to block tort liability.87
Second, the discussions of liability above refer only to the initial
allocation of liability; individual actors can change that allocation by
contract, including through indemnification agreements or through the
purchase of insurance.88 Two implications flow from this. Most
directly, more informed parties can signal quality by assuming liability
for problems—Digital Diagnostics carries medical malpractice liability
insurance for its IDx-DR diabetic retinopathy diagnosis system and
assumes liability for injuries arising from the system.89 Less directly,
insurers may serve as a separate, quasi-independent verifier of AI
system quality, where a positive evaluation could become necessary for
insurance coverage.
Third and finally, the dynamic nature of AI and injury further
complicates the picture of liability. How liability is allocated and
assigned when injury occurs shapes the behavior of developers,
institutions, and individuals90—but so does the amount of injury in the
first place.91 If the integration of AI systems into health-care practice
lowers the overall level of injury substantially, the picture changes.
Consider a stylized pre-AI system where physicians, hospitals, and
product developers equally share liability for injuries that occur. If 150
injuries occur, each is liable for the equivalent of 50 injuries. Imagine
the addition of AI makes hospitals liable for all the actions of
physicians (who blame systems for errors they would previously be
responsible for), but also cuts the rate of injuries by 60%. Now, out of
60 injuries, the hospital is liable for the equivalent of 40 (developers
20, and physicians zero). Even though liability allocation has changed,
the hospital is still better off because the overall rate of injuries has
decreased. This decrease is also, of course, a socially desirable outcome.
One could, however, change the story to get a socially bad outcome; if
lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:e0649735-a372-11eb-958501aa75ed71a1.0001.02/DOC_1&format=PDF
86 Resolution on Civil Liability for AI at 23.
87 Resolution on Civil Liability for AI at 26.
88 Ariel D Stern and others, ‘AI Insurance: How Liability Insurance Can Drive the
Responsible Adoption of Medical Artificial Intelligence’ (2022) 3 NEJM Catalyst
Innovations in Care Delivery.
89 Michael D Abràmoff, Danny Tobey and Danton S Char, ‘Lessons Learned
About Autonomous AI: Finding a Safe, Efficacious, and Ethical Path Through the
Development Process’ (2020) 214 American Journal of Ophthalmology 134, 139.
90 George Maliha and others, ‘Artificial Intelligence and Liability in Medicine:
Balancing Safety and Innovation’ (2021) 99 The Milbank Quarterly 629
91 Tobia, Nielsen and Stremitzer (n 6)
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liability allocation followed the same pattern but AI only decreased the
rate of injury by 40%, the hospital would be liable for the equivalent
of 60 out of 90 total injuries—and, if it knew this result ex ante, could
be expected to resist the implementation of the AI system, in a blow
to overall welfare. All of this is to say that liability for individual actors
tells only part of the story; the efficacy of the AI systems can
profoundly shift the overall picture.
As we noted at the outset, liability for medical AI presents a
complicated landscape, with many players, doctrines, and interactions.
Understanding the moving pieces is essential both for individual actors
in the system and policymakers considering how best to shape the
adoption of high-quality AI moving forward.
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